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And after all, you do at least get decent food out
there, so I hear.
– All Quiet on the Western Front
(Remarque 1982, p. 166).
Abstract: There is a reason they say an army marches on
its stomach. Well-fed soldiers fight better than starving
ones, but until the modern era, it was a great logistical
problem to provide reliable food and resources to an army
on the march. The Great Northern War (1700–1721) was a
conflict in which an alliance led by Peter the Great, Tsar of
Russia, challenged the supremacy of the Swedish Empire;
at that time, Sweden’s territories almost encircled the
Baltic. At stake were territories which would allow Russia
to gain a port on the Baltic Sea, giving Russia access to
European trade. Also, the King of Denmark, Frederick IV,
wanted to reclaim traditionally Danish lands in Southern
Sweden, and the Polish-Lithuanian monarch, Augustus II,
wanted to take Livonia from the Swedish Empire in order
to solidify his crown as a hereditary kingship, thereby
granting him more power and authority. This war is also
notable for the use of more modern methods to supply the
army beyond looting the land: Sweden, bolstered in the
early part of the war by an allotment system begun by
Charles XI, had comparatively large peacetime rations for
its serving men. It remained in use for the next 200 years.

Although there is keen interest in the military history of
many conflicts, the Great Northern War (1700–1721) is
relatively uncharted in terms of food history, despite its
ability to make visible the limits of the possible logistics of
supply for early warfare in a European context. The images
that emerge from current research typically focus on the
leadership and military strategies of Charles XII of Sweden
and Peter I of Russia and the aftermath of the war,1 which
toppled Sweden from its position of power and established
Russia as the dominant force in the Baltic. In this paper,
soldiers’ diaries, letters, and other historical accounts show
that in the early part of the war, Sweden set a high standard
for feeding its troops, which in part led them to aweinspiring victories against their enemies. In the later years
of the conflict, food shortages and destruction of the land
were key strategies in Russia’s effort to wrest the upper
hand from an enemy which seemed unbeatable.
This study will frame these elements in terms of
contemporary European mentalities toward food and
warfare. Analysis of these materials will demonstrate the

reality of food, famine, and superiority in what food
anthropologist Sidney Mintz termed “the single most
powerful instrument of dietary change in human
experience”: war (1996, p. 25). In Tasting Food, Tasting
Freedom (1996), Sidney Mintz outlines the processes by
which a society learns to “consume food differently,”
(p. 17); that is, how to integrate different foods, how to
prepare them differently, how the contexts in which we eat
may change, and how the purposes for which we eat can be
changed. War, Mintz notes, greatly changes the eating
habits of a community or nation.
The purpose of this work is to explore the historical
significance of soldier rations and mentalities about food as
it pertains to feeding and supplying an armed force.2 This is
an exploratory paper using a few carefully selected
examples to suggest connections to current scholarly
thinking about foodways which can be enriched through
closer study. Three main elements of military food supply
will be examined: 1) what food was deemed acceptable by
each force, as determined by the generals or heads of
military; 2) how the ability to supply such food worked;
and 3) what effects these choices and methods of
distribution may have had upon soldiers and their ways of
thinking about the food they ate. The intention is to use
these matters to illustrate how food, in wartime, is power.
During a military campaign, both civilians and soldiers
are expected to serve the needs of the nation in different
ways. Soldiers and the resources to feed them, the
foodstuffs themselves, cooking paraphernalia and expertise
to make a proper meal, must be mobilized. As Sidney
Mintz (1996) notes,
Large numbers of persons are assembled to do things
together — ultimately, to kill together. While
learning how, they must eat together. Armies travel
on their stomach; generals — and now economists
and nutritionists — decide what to put in them.
They must do so while depending on the national
economy and those who run it to supply them with
what they prescribe or, rather, they prescribe what
they are told they can rely upon having (p. 25).
In previous conflicts, such as the First Northern War
between Sweden and Denmark-Norway (1563–70), the
Swedish government experienced massive troubles both
raising the number of soldiers needed and keeping them
properly supplied. The army typically lived off the land,
taking contributions from the local populations where they
marched. The official statement to these people was, in
essence, that the army “wished to do [the peasants] no
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harm, but leave them safe in their houses with their families,
and protect them from all violence and desire or take
nothing from them apart from these contributions, and
necessary fodder and food” (Bienemann 1902, pp. 8, 15–16).
The contribution to gain such noble treatment by the army
was set at eight lod of silver per household (Frost 2000, p.75).
At the Diet of 1682, King Charles XI announced that
he would raise provisional infantry regiments of 1,200 men
and asked how such recruits would be provided.3 The
Peasant Estate made their preference for the knektehåll,
(contract) clear. In exchange for peasant farmers banding
together, usually in a rota of 2 full-value farms, to provide
the necessary wages and supplies for one soldier per rota
(e.g. wages, clothing, and housing), the farmer, his family
and servants were exempt from the traditional conscription
which was used to raise a fighting force. This tactic for
raising manpower had been used in 45 of the 60 years
before 1679, having profound effects on the communities
the recruits were pulled from. In the example of one
Swedish parish, 236 men were conscripted in sixteen levies
between 1620 and 1639, and almost all died in combat.
This “radically altered the demographic profile of the
parish,” almost halving the number of men between the
ages of fifteen and sixty (Lindegren 1980, pp. 144–77; see
also: Frost 2000, p. 205). In addition to the heavy toll of
warfare on the population, conscription could create deep
resentment within the community. Large segments of
society, including merchants or artisans, were often
exempted. Luard (1992) notes, “[i]t was generally believed
that recruits should be drawn from the classes of the lowest
social value, including criminals” (p. 39). As a result,
conscription was an ineffective way to raise an army. In
1627, when more than 300 soldiers were conscripted from
Kronoberg County in southern Sweden during war with
Poland, only 60 men appeared on the appointed day
(Nelsson 1993, p. 13). The rota also received tax incentives
for agreeing to support soldiers in this way and the king
was guaranteed a large, easily mobile force at far less cost to
his own Treasury. When the soldiers were not needed, they
would work the farms which provided their income,
contributing to the wellbeing of the farm in another way.
The community thus banded together to provide an army
to protect the interests of the state, rather than being
strongly encouraged to contribute money or supplies in
exchange for dubious promises of safety.
By instituting the allotment system, the Swedish crown
was able to maintain a professional army (Upton 1998,
pp. 73–8; Derry 2000, pp. 152–3). It also made the
Swedish army one of the largest in Europe and one of the
few which did not depend largely on mercenaries or
conscripted soldiers (Nelsson 1993, p. 46). Moreover, they
could be mobilized quickly in times of war, saving weeks
which would normally be spent on calling men to serve or
scouring the Treasury for money to pay mercenaries, under
the old system.4 At the start of the Great Northern War,
Sweden had an army totaling approximately 67,000 men:

25,000 infantry and 11,500 cavalry soldiers raised by the
rotar as part of the allotment system. A further 22,000 foot
soldiers and 8,500 cavalry were contracted by the crown
(Oakley 1992, p. 104). Ongoing conflict in the Baltic
region during much of the seventeenth century had helped
to turn Swedish soldiers into a highly trained militia whose
early success was undercut in the later years of the Great
Northern War by supply shortages and famine, among
other factors (Parrott 2012, p. 99).
With these advantages, the Swedish army could afford
to set a high standard for the care and feeding of its men.
The ideal ration prescribed for the Swedish troops in 1700
included a considerable amount of fat and protein: 625
grams of dry bread, 850 grams of butter or pork, one-third
liter of peas and 2.5 liters of weak beer for each soldier
(Åberg and Göransson 1976, pp. 26–7). In July 1718, near
the end of the Great Northern War, the listed ration for
each soldier in the Hälsingland regiment similarly included
637 grams of bread, 1/3 liter of groats (gryn), 283 grams of
meat and 16 grams of salt, as well as some brandy and
tobacco. Men overseeing the rationing and distribution of
wages noted that the rations were “quite abundant,”
although the prescribed 170 grams of butter or pork was
missing (Norrby 1980, p. 81). This regiment occupied the
relatively peaceful Trondelag region in Norway at the time,
and so can be expected to have had better access to food
and critical supplies.
This gives us a general picture of both what was
significant to the Swedish troops and what they could, or
thought they could, rely upon having: bread, dried peas or
groats, meat or butter, alcohol in the form of beer or
possibly brandy, tobacco and a bit of salt. Bread has long
been a staple in the diets of the civilized West. Bread wheat
is known to have evolved by 8000 BCE and archaeological
remains of leavened bread as we know it date back to 4000
BCE in Egypt (McGee 2004, p. 517). As far back as the 8th
century BCE, Homer used the word sitòfagoi (“breadeaters”) as a term synonymous with “men” in his writing
(Montanari and Brombert 2015, p. 54); and indeed, from
the diary examples discussed herein, “bread” is often
synonymous with “food.” Albrecht von Wallenstein, a
military leader in the Thirty Years’ War, once wrote that
his army needed bread, then munitions, and finally wages,
in that order (Hummelsberger 1986, p. 62; Parrott 2012,
p. 196). Bread was given to soldiers throughout history
because of its portability, tradition and bread’s position in
diet as a daily necessity. In this period, every soldier
required bread and 680 grams per day was typical. To provide
bread for a force of some 30,000, a week’s supply of flour, and
the wood and ovens required to bake it could require 250 carts
(Parker pp. 75–6). During the Great Northern War, a diary
entry from Second Lieutenant Robert Petrés dated April 13,
1704 comments that Chief Lieutenant Leuwenhaupt ordered
300 horses to drive in provisions but the enemy had already
overtaken 30 to 40 men at the task, leaving no more than
two alive. Upon learning of the attacks, Leuwenhaupt
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abandoned whatever provisions and livestock had already
been collected to make a quick escape (Petrés 1902, p. 19)
reflecting a time-honored military strategy of hitting the
enemy where it hurts most: the food supply.
As another often-mentioned ration, the benefits of
alcoholic beverages to soldiers in combat are myriad. In
general, beer was thought to be highly nutritious, as the
malting process “raised the caloric value of the base cereal,
giving beer more calories than bread made with an
equivalent amount of grain” (Phillips 2014, p. 37). In
addition, it was rich in carbohydrates, vitamins, and
proteins, and gave the drinker a pleasant feeling. The daily
ration could be drunk without interfering with one’s work,
making it excellent for hydration. Indeed, British medical
officer John Bell, who served in the seventeenth century,
regarded beer as an “invigorating, antiseptic, salutary
beverage […] highly nutritive” for soldiers (Phillips 2014,
p. 276). Keegan (1978) states,
The prospect of battle […] seems always to alarm men’s
anxieties, however young and vigorous they be, rather
than excite their anticipation. Hence the drinking
which seems an inseparable part both of preparation
for battle and combat itself. Alcohol, as we know,
depresses the self-protective reflexes, and so induces
the appearance and feeling of courage (p. 326).
The importance of a ready supply of bread and alcohol,
in particular, is clear as far back as Ovid’s Metamorphoses,
composed around 8 AD. The three daughters of a priest of
Apollo named Anius were able to change everything they
touched into bread, wine or oil. Lines 790–799 relate that
Agamemnon heard of their gifts and demanded they feed
the Greek army, under threat of war (Ovid 2010, p. 371).
Anius also had a son whose gift was to prophecy the future,
but apparently this was not as valuable a skill to the
military leader as producing food.
Considered in this light, food can be seen as central to a
soldier’s survival and identity as a civilized person of
Western culture. Additionally, the way any given group
eats helps assert its hierarchy and organization, and at the
same time, both its togetherness and the otherness of
whoever eats differently. Food is central to individual
identity, in that any given individual is in part constructed,
biologically, psychologically and socially by the food
culture he/she is a part of (Fischler 1988, p. 275). Sidney
Mintz (1996) comments that the ability to supply an army
properly is itself a show of power,
not only because it may include some ability to
bestow meaning, but also because meaning
coalesces around certain relationships. Objects,
ideas and persons take on a patterned structural
unity in the creation of ritual, […] But it was the
purveyors of the foods, the givers of employment,
the servants of the state, who exercised the power
that made the foods available (p. 30–31).
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However, rations could not be counted on in the field in
the same way they could be during peacetime or when
occupying relatively stable regions. Against the high rate of
attrition, Charles XII’s insistence on marching into Russia
and the enemy attacks on their relief forces and supplies,
the allotment system was not enough. Following their
stunning victory at Narva in 1700 against a much larger
Russian force, by 1702 one regiment was so “poorly
provided with uniforms and provisions” (Höglund 1996,
p. 48) that they had to be placed in Reval in the Baltic
provinces. In August of 1708, Charles led his troops into
Russian territory, where they faced Peter the Great’s forces,
which were stationed between the Soja and the Dnieper.
Waliszewski (2013) comments that “they were driven to
support themselves by gathering ears of corn, which they
ground between two stones. Sickness began to thin their
ranks. Their three doctors, so the fierce troopers said, were
‘brandy, garlic, and death’!” (p. 391). By this time, diaries
frequently mention that “the army had long suffered from a
shortage of bread” (Petrés 1902, p. xxv). By September
1708, the Russians had destroyed the landscape around
their enemy in an effort to keep the Swedish from finding
food or supplies on the march. A diary entry by Lieutenant
Joachim Matthiæ Lyth from September 28 comments,
Under this march through the forest, we lost many
men and many horses, which died of hunger, so that
our misery grew ever greater; we had to watch as
both men and horses alike, exhausted by hunger,
dropped to the ground and died there miserably; so
it remained for us doubly worse (Lyth 1903,
pp. 60–1; Frost 2000, p. 286).
Reinforcements led by Swedish general Lewenhaupt met
Charles’s force in October of 1708, but they had been
defeated by engagements with the Russians on the way, and
the relief rations and artillery they carried was lost.
However, the diary of a Second Lieutenant reveals
brennevin5 and tobacco were brought out to the men by
General Major Lagercrona, likely to bolster their morale
(Petrés 1902, pp. 183–4). The taste of tobacco and the
comfort of brennevin may well have been emblems of
everyday life to the soldiers, much like Coca-Cola was to
the soldiers of World War II. In 1942, when supplies of the
soft drink were threatened by sugar rationing of that time,
one letter from January 1942 pleaded with a local bottler to
keep producing the beloved beverage: “Very few people
ever stopped to consider the great part Coca-Cola plays in
the building and the maintenance of morale among
military personnel” (Pendergrast 2013, p. 185; Mintz
1996, pp. 25–32). Back in the Ukraine and on the march,
thousands of soldiers ultimately starved or froze to death,
though the war was far from over (Höglund 1996, p. 5).
The inability of the Swedish government to provide food
for its troops was a microcosm of the larger problems of the
war and any advantage the allotment system provided them
was quickly spent.
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The regiment leaders did what they could with the
supplies they had. At the battle of Helsingborg in
Denmark in 1710, the army marched on the alcohol in its
bloodstream, having only three farthings’ worth of
brennevin that morning, and nothing else (Höglund 1996,
p. 13). Despite this extreme circumstance, they were able to
stop the Danish army’s attempt, for the third and final
time, to reclaim its Scanian lands which had been Swedish
territory since 1658. Second Lieutenant Robert Petrés
comments in a diary entry dated December 31, 1708 that
his men were charged far too much (1 ducat) for a kanna
(approximately 2.6 litres)6 of brennevin, but the cost was
split between 12 soldiers (1902, p. 203). As mentioned
above, alcohol was a necessary thing in the military, from
our earliest records. Speaking of Greek and Roman battle
tactics, Hanson (1989) states that the formal nature of
Greek battle created a
mounting, relentless tension as troops were
deployed in sight of each other and yet at the same
time provided a lull before this store, where soliders
might have tried to steel their jittery nerves in any
possible manner. Since Homer, the Greeks had
recognized that alcohol had some analgesic value
against wound trauma. Many soliders may have
been drinking simply too dull the senses in expectation
of a painful penetration would to come (125).
Alcohol was a necessary expense that day, despite having
survived the desolation of the Ukraine campaign a few
weeks before or perhaps because of it. The brennevin may
have been a salve to any hurts or “jittery nerves” they may
have been suffering in the aftermath.
It is not uncommon to see degradation of soldiers’ food
supply and diet as a war goes on, especially in pre-modern
times. Even today’s militaries, with the advantages of
pre-packaged food and speedy distribution, can have
trouble keeping soldiers well-fed in the field. A 1995 US
military study showed that there was still “an energy deficit
of 500 to 2,000 kcal/d and resultant weight loss for the
study participants” in the field (Marriott 1995, p. 10), but
that augmenting their rations with frequent snacks and hot
meals could help them to maintain weight. The difference
here is that the United States has the ability to feed its
soldiers consistently enough that this small weight loss is
manageable. For the Swedish army, loss of rations could
mean death for the men. About 150,000 Swedish perished
in the Great Northern War; 25,000 in combat and 125,000
more due to famine, sickness and exhaustion (Wolke 2004).
Snack foods and regularly scheduled hot meals were a
distant memory to many Carolean regiments in the field.
When food supplies were low, they ate what they could cull
from their rations, and when that failed they ate whatever
they could find on the land. Described by Andrea Maraschi
as a “hierarchy of desperation,”7 the end result of such a
hierarchy could be grim indeed. Historically, there are many
examples of a fighting force being driven to eat their support

animals (e.g. horses, dogs) and finally to cannibalism in an
attempt to survive8, though there is no evidence that the
Swedish army did so in this conflict. Sweden and its army
were deeply Christian at this time,9 and the Church had
longstanding rules regarding the eating of certain flesh.10 It
is unclear whether or not the Swedish soldiers might have
broken this taboo in an attempt to survive, if records of such
acts were lost, or if cold and disease killed them too quickly
to try. It is clear the situation became direr over time. In
1716, remarks on the general muster were depressing, as
most men were without uniforms, and “ammunitions and
bread wagons the same” (Höglund 1996, p. 57).
Carolean soldiers were much more likely to desert the
camp or otherwise try to escape in times of hardship. A
member of the Dalarna Regiment, Jonas Wallberg, was one
of men who surrendered to Russia after the disastrous
Battle of Poltava. His diary describes prison rations as a
quarter barrel of flour, some grouts and a palm of salt per
month for each prisoner. After two years of this, he names
food as the motivation for multiple escape attempts,
despite the heavy consequences for his actions:
me, 4 under officers and 1 corporal decided to
escape. We had walked 12 miles when we reached a
village and to avoid famine we tried to beg for food
in Russian. A young farmer revealed us to the
villagers as Swedish refugees and they rang a bell
calling in all the surrounding farmers who came
running with spears and sticks. They arrested us
and beat us badly. The next day they escorted us
back to the prison camp at Ziroda. There, Colonel
Rickman ordered his men to put tree bolts on our
feet so we had to sit for 6 weeks getting only water
and a handful of flour per day (Wallberg 1912, p. 309).
Wallberg’s toil continued as he attempted to escape a
second time. When they were captured by Russian
Cossacks and brought back to camp again, they were
“tortured nonstop.” Despite this, the diary shows that the
soldier was concerned with food above all else: “I desired to
find someone among the population who would be willing
to give me some extra food in secret” Wallberg 1912,
p. 309), but there was none to be found.
These accounts of suffering, from those soldiers who
defended the Scanian territories from a Danish march with
only a little alcohol to warm their bellies to soldiers who risked
torture and imprisonment in search of food beg the question:
what were they fighting for? Sidney Mintz (1996) comments,
It may be relevant that soldiers overseas have not
only been stripped of almost all the marks of their
individuality (clothing, jewelry, coiffure), but
because they are in a remote land, they also feel
bereft of those material representations of their
culture that are embodied in architecture and in
linguistic forms (familiar buildings, signs,
advertising). Under such circumstances, which can
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be alienating, objects that can “carry” a displaced
sense of culture, such as foods and beverages, take
on an additional potential power (p. 27).
The food itself, in the absence of all other familiar
markings of home and country, could represent the
quintessential national experience to a soldier on the move.
In addition, native soldiers’ ability to stomach the rations
could mark them as one of Sweden’s own. Notes from a
regiment raised in 1707 through enlistment of Saxon
prisoners of war comment that the new recruits struggled
with the unfamiliar food, which was often dried and
heavily salted, causing high rates of sickness and death
(Höglund 1996, p. 50). Other armies suffered this as well,
as original recruits perished and more men had to be
brought in from foreign lands. On the subject of conscripts
from Norway brought into the Danish army — one of
Sweden’s enemies in the Great Northern War — “Their
eating habits surprised somewhat though. Their standard
bread was made from oat and water, so initially their
stomachs had trouble with the sourdough bread of the
Danish army, but if they only survived that, they became
good soldiers” (Höglund, Sallnäs and Bespalov 2006,
p. 117). Claude Fischler (1988) states that,
[f]ood is central to our sense of identity. The way
any given human group eats helps assert its
diversity, hierarchy and organization, and at the
same time, both its oneness and the otherness of
whoever eats differently. Food is also central to
individual identity, in that any given individual is
constructed, biologically, psychologically and socially
by the food he/she chooses to incorporate (275).
With this in mind, we can see then how the otherness of
a soldier who cannot stomach the chosen rations for a given
group would mark himself both as outside his normal
milieu but also biologically different from his peers on an
individual level. In another way, those in power who make
decisions regarding feeding the group, such as General
Major Lagercrona who allowed the familiar tastes of
brennevin and tobacco to be distributed to the men despite
the difficult loss of reinforcements and supplies in the fall
of 1708 identified themselves as leaders in the groups
hierarchy, with the authority to give out food and to
provide whatever relief these items could offer. This marked
them all as one, making the best of a difficult situation by
partaking together.
Conclusions
Though this research is brief and only compares a few
primary sources in the form of diaries from the Great
Northern War, the topic could easily be expanded to include
other materials, other conflicts or similar comparisons
between other nations and their treatment of military
rations and supply. Military history is a growing field, and
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much has already been done with more modern conflicts
such as the World Wars period, but it would be interesting to
see what interpretations might be made with older conflicts
across cultures. As Sidney Mintz (1996) mentions, there is
still much to be done with questions of large-scale structural
changes to society and culture (e.g. war, migration) and how
they cause people to “reorder their categories of meaning in
new ways, and to eat (and drink) differently” (pp. 30–1). By
examining the military engagement through the lens of food
choices and supply we may discover more within these
categories of meaning in our foodways and how they are
manipulated by those whom Mintz calls “the purveyors of
the foods” (1996, p. 31) who make foods available to be
reinterpreted by the public. In trying to understand the
deeper meaning of food and power in war, we enhance our
understanding of food history as a whole.
With this, it is possible to suggest that, according to a
long tradition of military and civilian use, the bread the
soldiers ate was both practical, portable, nourishing and an
emblem of home and, in essence, what the soldiers were
fighting for. Alcohol represented civilization, encouraged
soldiers when there was little else and provided muchneeded hydration; moreover, it represented a surcease of the
pain and psychological strain of warfare. The rest of the
rations provided essential energy in the field. Sweden’s
adoption of the allotment system before the Great
Northern War showed an interest in improving supply
chains and access for soldiers to essential rations, as well as
forming a more communal system by which soldiers would
be available for the army, rather than the heavy burden
which conscription had placed on the people in the past.
Unfortunately, the optimism and early successes of the war,
exemplified by the incredible victory at Narva, was not to
last. As diaries and other evidence shows, on subsequent
campaigns, soldiers were frequently without rations or
essential supplies and instead had to forage or beg for food.
Much like the way soldiers in World War II viewed
Coca-Cola, it must have been that the bread or brennevin
they were given that came to represent home and country,
something to keep a man going when survival was not
certain; in fact, the ability to eat a soldier’s ration without
indigestion could easily mark one as an insider, one who
belongs to the group. The fact that many more Carolean
soldiers and civilians died from malnourishment and poor
health than died in combat is a clear indication of Sweden’s
inability to leverage the power of its resources, so carefully
selected and arranged in peacetime to produce a large,
efficient, well-fed military, into a victory against the
Russians, who overwhelmed with patience through the
long cold winters, burning the landscape, and attacking
supply wagons so that no food could be found.
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Notes
1. Voltaire published a biography aggrandizing the
Swedish monarch in 1735, The History of Charles XII,
King of Sweden. See also: Bain 1902 for an investigation
of Charles XII’s character and actions during the Great
Northern War; Keep 1985 on the Russian army and
Peter’s leadership during this period; Massie 2012
offers a comprehensive biography of Peter the Great;
Rogers 1995 summarizes key arguments regarding
military tactics throughout early modern Europe.
2. Parrott (2012) outlines the sophisticated and extensive
networks of private enterprise required to properly
supply an army in early modern Europe; Chapter 2,
“Supplying War” in Parker (1996) discusses how
seventeenth-century European armies, which grew to
include 10–12 million men, handled recruitment,
financing and supply matters (p. 46).
3. For a detailed description of the Diet of 1682 and its
legislation, see Upton 1998, pp. 43–49.
4. A levy was issued in February 1689 to distribute the
burden of feeding, transporting and housing troops on
the march over the entire population rather than, as
was typical, having the costs fall upon communities
surrounding main roads; a modified march order in
April 1696 attempted to quell public outcry over the
levy, explaining “because all will enjoy the defense and
security […] all, each according to their condition, help
to sustain the burdens involved” (Upton 1998, p. 82).
5. Brennevin is a schnapps common to Scandinavia,
called “brenwijn” in the original sources
6. (Cardarelli 1999, p. 208).
7. A. Maraschi, “Sucking Powers, Sucking Identity. Giants,
Witches and Cannibal Heroes in Medieval Iceland”,
manuscript submitted for publication (2018), pp. 7–8.
8. Notably, Saxo Grammaticus’s The History of the Danes (1979)
tells of the starving army of the Danish king, Hadingus,
which was reduced to this diet in war against the Swedish
at the beginning of the 13th century (Book I, p. 28).
9. Gudmundsson (2014) comments, “Historians writing
about the battles of Charles XII agree that the soldiers’

morale and discipline instilled by chaplains contributed
to the Swedish victories.” (p. 213). If army commanders
knew a battle was coming, soldiers were encouraged to
partake of the Communion; otherwise, regimental
prayers with hymns and prayer occurred twice per day,
while services held three times per week included a
sermon (Gudmundsson 2014, p. 214).
10. Leviticus 11 covers acceptable food, and warns against
eating horses because they have split hooves but do not
chew cud. Likewise, dogs and other animals were
forbidden because they walk on their paws on the
ground and are thus unclean. Medieval penitentials
discuss common transgressions such as the eating of
“unclean” foods and the proper penance for them;
Bonnassie 1989 compares Libri Paenitentiales and the
Chroniques and Annales to identify seven categories of
food prohibition, ranging from touching to partially
eating to knowingly eating the “unclean” animals.
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